NATO has been the most successful alliance of history. We
repeat
this truth quite frequently, especially now that we celebrate
60
years of its successful existence. Yes, it is true. Especially
for the
Cold War period. Of course, it is impossible to offer a “scientific”
proof for this, since history cannot be reversed and
experimented
with, but it is more than obvious given the facts of that part
of
history that clearly show that NATO in several occasions
played a
crucial role and also that its very existence was the most
credible
and effective deterrent. Nobody can therefore deny –
except for
ideological reasons – that the above-mentioned common
place
reflects the truth.
This is all
very important, but what is even more, much more
important is
the answer to the question: will NATO play a similar
role in the
future? Will NATO continue to be the most effective
instrument of
securing peace in Europe – or elsewhere? It is
already
difficult enough to ask the right question given the
complexity of
security today, not only in geographic terms, but in
terms of substance, too. It might be seen as “spoiling
the fun” to
ask this
question while celebrating the great past, but this question
must be asked.
We are obliged to do so, not only by the glorious
past, but much
more importantly by the security needs of today.
And we must
ask all the questions. The politically incorrect ones,
too.
Especially those. Since these questions reflect the real feeling
of danger that
we cannot even formulate yet correctly. Since the
answer to
these questions will determine our future. Not only the
future of the
members of the Alliance, but the future of the world in
its entirety.
Accordingly, we must ask the question: do we need
NATO? Is NATO
the right answer to the real security dilemmas we
face? Or is it
a part of it? If so, what else do we need? And: should
the answer be
affirmative, what kind of NATO do we need? Do we
have to change
our beloved NATO, if so, how? And, finally and
probably most
importantly: in addition to telling where we want to
go in the
development of NATO, we also must find the answer to
the “How
to get there” question and also what WE need to do, how
WE must
contribute to it? Now is the time to ask these questions,
while we work
on the new strategic concept, which will be crucial
for the future
of NATO.
NATO has to
deal today with a world, where the challenges, the
threats are
different, or rather, where most of the threats is
different from
the traditional ones, since they are more complex,
i.e. not
(only) military in their nature and those who pose these
threats tend
to be non-state actors (terrorists, criminals, migrants,
corrupt
officials, etc.). It is therefore normal that NATO, an
organization
created to deal with traditional inter-state conflicts,
overwhelmingly
military in nature, is in trouble. We all are, all our
institutions,
state and international, including international law and
all
international security institutions. NATO, too, has to find the
right
answer(s). Let us look at the two main missions NATO has to
fulfill.
The first,
more traditional mission of NATO is collective defense.
The famous
Article V of the Washington Treaty says:
“The Parties agree
that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America
shall be considered an attack against them all and
consequently they agree
that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them,
in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties
so attacked by taking
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other
Parties, such action as it
deems necessary, including the use of armed force,
to restore and maintain the
security of the North Atlantic area.” I
During the
Cold War the general assumption was that this would
mean that the
Alliance would react to an eventual Soviet attack by
using all
available forces of all members, i.e. “in concert with the
other
Parties…including the use of armed force”. This assumption
worked: it
effectively deterred the Soviets form attacking any
NATO member
state, since they interpreted this provision – and
this is still
the general belief – as a commitment to act together and
to use
military force in case of a military attack. Legally speaking,
however, this
is not true. What Article V means is nothing more –
and nothing
less – than that Parties will act, considering an attack
on one as an
attack on all, but it does NOT mean that they will ALL
react the same
way and it does not mean either that they will use
military
force. This is left to the consideration of member states.
And so it
happened. The Alliance has invoked Article V only once
in its
history: in a historic decision the North-Atlantic Council
decided on
September 12th, 2001:
:The Council agreed that if
it is determined that this attack was directed from
abroad against the United
States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by
Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty, which states that an armed attack against
one or more of the Allies in
Europe or North America shall be considered an
attack against them all.”
Ii
and nothing
really happened. It was not ALL member states, which
participated
in the US operation against Afghanistan – mind you:
ISAF happened
only years later and it is not an Article V operation,
i.e. it is not
based on the above-cited decision. The effects were
not
emphasized, but they changed the image of NATO – back –
to
its original:
collective military defense on the basis of Article V is an
assumption,
not an obligation and cannot be taken for granted.
The Cold War
credibility of Article V, thus of NATO, was further
undermined by the
inability – or rather lack of readiness - of the
Alliance to
react to the famous Turkish request on the basis of
Article V
during the US-led invasion of Iraq.
The demise of
the credibility of Article V, thus of NATO, however,
is not limited
to this. There is an even more fundamental problem
that we are
extremely hesitant to mention that undermined our
capability to
defend all members even more.
Collective
defense is only credible, if it covers ALL member states
and if the
necessary capabilities are available, including the
necessary
planning scenarios and contingency plans. When NATO
expended then
member states tried to appease Russia by taking –
unilateral –
commitments that were meant to alleviate Russian
fears that
enlargement was effectively and objectively aimed at
Russia. We
committed ourselves not to deploy significant NATO
forces,
including nuclear weapons on the territory of new member
states. This
seemed to be a harmless commitment looking at real
threats the
time enlargement happened, but it broke one of the
basic legs of
collective defense: there are member states of the
Alliance,
which cannot be defended in the case of an eventual
attack, or
rather that can only be defended – or re-conquered –
using means
(nuclear weapons) that makes the defense of these
countries is
obviously not credible. This means that the while
taking the
Baltic countries in the Alliance as full-fledged members
was beyond
doubt the right decision, NATO did not pay attention
to the
consequences, because it thought there was no danger that
such a
contingency would ever occur and also, it did not want to
“provoke”
Russia.
The result is
that three member states of the Alliance are now in a
situation that
they cannot be effectively defended against an
eventual
attack by means other than returning the old doctrine of
the early Cold
War, massive retaliation, which is obviously not
something we
want to do, nor is it credible in the eyes of any
potential
aggressor that NATO member states would launch an
overall
nuclear war to defend the Baltic states.
This situation
is unacceptable for the Alliance – or rather it should
be -, but for
quite a while we could convince ourselves that such a
danger was
beyond imagination. Now, however, this is more and
more difficult.
If we look at the decisions taken early this year by
the Russian
Federation, especially at the creation of a “Russian
NATO”,
the militarization of the Russia dominated CSTO and,
especially,
the announcement by the Russian leadership that they
will not only
create their own rapid reaction force, but they will
deploy the
first – Russian – units on the border of Russia with the
Baltic states
and also having in mind the reckless Russian
aggression
against Georgia in 2008, we cannot leave this without
reaction. It
is in no way to suggest that I would suspect that Russia
would prepare
for an attack against a NATO member states, but
we all know
that security must be based on capabilities, not
intentions. On
the other hand, such steps, even if totally
ununderstandable
and illogical, must not remain without reaction.
Otherwise it
will really undermine our credibility and serve almost
as an
invitation for anybody with bad intensions.
What should be
done? First, this not so new situation must be
recognized in
the new strategic concept. Secondly, appropriate
steps should
be considered and undertaken, such as
prepositioning
equipment on the territory of the Baltic states,
preparation of
relevant planning scenarios and the necessary
steps in case…Thirdly,
the deployment of allied troops, on a
temporary or
even long-term basis should not be excluded
anymore. And,
finally, but very importantly, our policy towards
Russia has to
be re-examinediii
and it has to
be made clear that we
do not stand
idle, when such provocative steps are announced and
undertaken.
This will be a
painful process. I see little chance that most NATO
countries
would be ready to depart in that road. But it will be
unavoidable at
some point: the later we recognize it and the later
we react, the
more dangerous the situation will become and the
more difficult
it will be to find the necessary measure. I can only
hope that our
reaction will happen in time. Otherwise not only our
beloved NATO
will suffer a fatal blow – much worse than an
eventual
unsuccessful Afghanistan operation -, but also the
security of
our countries and the entire world will be in danger.
i The Washington Treaty, 1949. Article V.
ii Statement of the North‐Atlantic Council on September
12, 2001.
iii We should, at last, recognize that current day Russia is
NOT, will not be in the
foreseeable
future and doesn’t want to be a strategic partner. Our policy
should
be
cooperation, where possible and confrontation, where necessary (my
Russia
doctrine
would be best called “cooperative containment”).
